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ACCESS TO INFORMATION, TRANSACTION COSTS AND MARKETING 
CHOICE OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS BETWEEN MIDDLEMEN AND DIRECT 
BUYERS IN BANGLADESH 
 
Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of information cost and other transaction costs on rural producers’ 
discrete choice between selling to middlemen and direct buyers, and continuous choice of selling intensity to 
middlemen and direct buyers. Using transaction costs economics as an analytical framework to decompose the 
different origins of transaction costs, the paper empirically investigates the impact of transaction costs on farm 
households’ marketing behaviour in the context of Bangladesh. Empirical findings of this paper suggest that 
access to information in the form of access to telephone and other form of transaction costs play a significant 
role in producers’ marketing behaviour. For information cost, a unit change in distance to telephone increases the 
probability of choosing direct buyer over middlemen by more than 4 percent and sales to direct buyer by more 
than 8 percent.  
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we study the impact of information cost and other transaction costs on rural 
producers’ discrete choice between selling to middlemen and direct buyers, and continuous 
choice of selling intensity to middlemen and direct buyers. More specifically, we try to 
address two questions: first, does access to information bring any change in producers’ 
discrete choice between selling to middlemen vis-à-vis selling to direct buyers? Second, does 
access to information bring any change in the continuous choice of selling intensity between 
selling to middlemen vis-à-vis selling to direct buyers? We address these two questions under 
a transaction cost economics framework while controlling for other possible economic 
factors. We consider access to telecommunications as a proxy for the access to information 
and examine the issue of transaction costs for the rural producers of Bangladesh. The presence 
of transaction cost is widely held responsible to explain the observed market failures and self-
sufficiency in agriculture in developing countries.
1 
 
Transaction can take place directly between buyers and sellers or indirectly through 
intermediaries. Intermediaries are economic agents who specialize in the activities of buying 
and selling the same product(s). Better known as middlemen in the context of developing 
countries, they mediate selling between the seller of a product and its potential buyers. 
Existence of frictions in trade gives rise to the function of intermediation. In the case of direct 
transaction, i.e., when transaction takes place directly between buyers and sellers, they share 
the transaction (trade) surplus. In the case of middlemen negotiated trade, middlemen share 
the surplus with buyers and sellers. Economic literature rationalizes the intermediation by 
arguing that intermediaries emerge because they are able to economize on the cost of 
transactions and information asymmetries.
2 
 
                                                 
1 See Key et. al. (2000) for a recent theoretical as well as empirical analysis on the presence of transaction costs 
and observed market failure.  
2 See Townsend, Robert M., (1978) for cost of transactions and Freixas and Rochet (1997, page 16) for 
information asymmetries in the context of financial intermediaries.    2 
One fundamental source of transaction costs is the information cost. Neo-classical economists 
essentially assume that information is costless and perfect, which does not comply with the 
reality, particularly of developing countries.
3 When information is not costless has important 
implications in present and future contracts and transactions. Transactions and contracts, 
which could be feasible in the presence of perfect information, may not occur.
4 In developing 
countries, economic agent overcomes this informational problem, whether ex-ante adverse 
selection, interim moral hazard, or ex-post costly state of verification, through different 
informal arrangements and institutions. Existence of middlemen can be viewed as one of the 
arrangements to overcome transaction costs and costly information. 
 
Access to telecommunications has potentials to overcome limitations associated with 
information imperfection, and a reduction in transaction costs. ‘Two key determinants of 
market emergence are the costs associated with acquiring information, and the cost of 
negotiating transactions’
5 and the spread of telecommunications is expected to reduce both-
acquiring and negotiation costs. Recent expansion of telecommunications services to rural 
areas in Bangladesh has increased the access of rural households to information. Under this 
background, we examine the impact of transaction costs of rural households’ marketing 
choice between middlemen and direct buyers where search and information cost appears as 
part of transaction costs.  
 
We have chosen three agricultural products, eggs, chicken and milk, which are produced by 
relatively poor rural households in Bangladesh. These products have been used as a source of 
income generating activities in rural Bangladesh following NGO-led micro credit and poverty 
alleviation programs. As micro credit usually requires weekly payments, these products 
generate income streams that fit with the payment requirements of micro credit better than 
that of other agricultural products, e.g. rice and other staple crops. As a result, both NGOs and 
their borrowers prefer these products. Although production and consumption separability is an 
important question for agricultural households, as the production is credit supported, the 
chosen products are basically produced for the market. In addition, surveyed households that 
produce these three products participate in the market in one or the other form.  
 
Table-1 shows the information source about the product price of rural farm households that 
we have surveyed in Bangladesh and table-2 shows discrete choice of marketing channels 
between selling to direct buyers and middlemen. Both tables compare the observations 
                                                 
3 As put in Stiglitz (1988), ‘If information transmission and processing were costless and if there were no 
incentive problems- so everyone transmitted all of his information accurately- clearly there would be everything 
to be gained, and nothing to be lost, from the centralization of information. But these assumptions are no more 
realistic than the assumption that goods are costlessly produced, and drop, freely from the sky, like manna from 
Heaven’.  
4 See Akerlof (1970). 
5 See Leff (1984).   3 
between villages with telephone and villages without telephone. It appears from table-1 that 
for all three products, producers that live in villages without telephone rely more on 
middlemen to get information about the price of their products. Coincidently, as can be seen 
from table-2, farm households’ discrete choice of marketing channels between middlemen 
and direct buyers seems also to be different between households living in villages with 
telephone from the households living in villages without telephone. For all three products, the 
former group of households selects direct buyers over middlemen more often than the later 
group. It appears from the observed pattern that the difference in access to telephone can lead 
to a difference in source of information and a difference in choice of marketing channels of 
rural producers.  
 
Table-1: Source of Information about Price (in percentage): Village with and without Telephone
6 
Information Egg  Producers Poultry  Producers Milk  Producers 
Source A  B  A B  A  B 
Middleman  28.21 4.35  21.21 8.70  5.71  0.00 
Not from middlemen  71.79  95.66  78.79  91.3  94.29  100 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00 
No  of  producers  39 23 33 23  35  10 
A: Village without Telephone; B: Village with Telephone 
 
Table-2: Households’ Choice of Marketing Channels: Village with and without Telephone 
Sell to direct buyers  Village without Telephone  Village with Telephone  Total 
No  38 (33.04)  4  (6.90)  42 (24.28) 
Yes  77 (66.96)  54 (93.10)  131 (75.72) 
Total  115 (100.00)  58 (100.00)  173 (100.00) 
Numbers in the parentheses are the percentage. 
 
To explain the observed relationship between access to telephone and producer’s choice 
between direct selling vis-à-vis mediated selling, we use transaction cost economics 
(henceforth TCE) developed by Coase as the analytical framework.
7 The usual assumption is 
that the producer is a cost minimizer and under a given technology and institutional 
environment, his/her choice between direct selling versus mediated selling is determined by 
information cost and other transaction costs minimizing motive. For empirical estimation, we 
estimate a probit model to examine the impact of transaction costs variables on producers’ 
discrete choice between mediated vis-à-vis direct selling. For selling intensity, we estimate a 
two limits tobit model to examine the observed pattern under transaction costs framework.  
 
The set of articles that are concerned with explaining empirically the existence of middlemen 
in the context of developing countries is limited mostly to middlemen’s margin on 
transaction.
8 We are not aware of any previous attempt that explains producers’ choice 
                                                 
6 Unless otherwise stated, all the data used in this paper are from a primary survey. For survey coverage and 
method, see section-4.  
7 Coase (1937) in his seminal paper, ‘The nature of the firm’ first introduced the term ‘transaction costs’ to 
explain why firms exist. Later, economists have incorporated transaction cost framework to explain different 
economic outcomes. Many economists have subsequently extended the TCE framework. See for example 
Williamson (1975, 1991). See also Fahlbeck, E., (1996) and the references therein (p.1) 
8 See for example, Minten and Kyle (1999).   4 
between middlemen and direct selling incorporating the role of transaction costs. The other 
distinguishing feature of the present paper is the choice of products. While previous attempts 
are mostly concerned with staple crops where production has a high self-consumption motive, 
products that we consider in this paper are basically produced for the market. This difference 
in product choice has additional rationale. A problem with staple crops is that the observed 
price gap between buyer and seller can arise not only due to transaction costs but also due to 
transfer costs. Middlemen usually add some services in between that turn middlemen’s 
product superior compared to raw farm products. All the three chosen products in context of 
rural markets in Bangladesh are homogenous and middlemen do not include any explicit 
transfer value there.  
 
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: section 2 describes different origins of 
transaction costs and formalize the problem, section 3 describes the rural producers and their 
marketing options, section 4 estimates the impact of transaction costs both on the discrete 
choice of marketing channels and on selling intensity of rural producers, and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Transaction Costs and Producers’ Choice: An Analytical Framework 
Economists have reasoned the existence of middlemen from different perspectives.
9 However, 
following the literature on financial institutions, we rationalize the functioning of middlemen 
by arguing that intermediaries emerge because they are able to economize on the cost of 
transaction.
10 Transaction cost (henceforth TC) is the gap between buying and selling price.
11 
Although TC affects both buyers and sellers, we limit ourselves to the impact on sellers.  
 
One standard assumption of neoclassical economics is costless transaction at market clearing 
prices, which means exchange involves zero transaction cost. However, once we depart from 
the frictionless world of neoclassical economics, we find that transaction essentially involves 
search for potential buyers, negotiation with them, and enforcement of transaction/contract. 
Each of these steps adds costs to the transaction and generates a wedge between buying and 
selling price. As a result, transaction costs reduce the market size, and in extreme cases, when 
transaction costs are very high, the market may fail.  
 
Transaction costs have various origins. However, following Hobbs (1997) the different 
origins of TCs can be arranged under three categories: i) information and search costs, ii) 
negotiation costs, and iii) monitoring and enforcement costs. It may be noted that these 
                                                 
9 For example, middlemen reduce the time period that buyers and sellers have to wait for a transaction to take 
place (Rubistein, A. and A. Wolinsky. 1987), they reduce the moral hazard problem otherwise faced by buyers 
(Biglaiser, G. 1993), and improve welfare when product quality is not immediately observable by buyers (Li, 
Yiting. 1998). 
10 See Townsend, Robert M. (1978) in the context of financial intermediaries.  
11 See Hirshleifer, Jack. (1984), page 421-23.   5 
categories are neither independent nor mutually exclusive as one could influence other. We 
discuss all three categories in brief.  
 
Information and search costs are an important part of transactions costs (though information 
problems arise in other contexts as well).
12 The role of information enters into the exchange in 
the form of communication. One characteristic of perfect market is perfect communication. 
For voluntary exchange to take place, offers must be communicated and alternatives from 
both the buyer and seller side must be compared. Due to the high cost or absence of 
information, these two essential preconditions of exchange cannot meet, and that results in 
either limited/less than equilibrium transaction or in extreme cases, complete absence of 
certain desired transactions.  
 
In addition to collecting information and the searching for potential buyers and sellers, 
economic transactions are usually preceded by negotiations. The negotiation cost of a 
particular transaction depends on market structure, producer’s dependency and product 
knowledge. While a competitive market provide a producer with more certainty about selling 
the product, producer’s dependency on a limited number of buyers decreases his/her 
bargaining power and increases negotiation costs. It follows that producer’s choice of 
marketing channel changes the negotiation costs as it changes his/her bargaining power. In 
addition, high dependency on any product and poor knowledge about the product can 
influence bargaining power negatively; hence a high negotiation cost results. Other sources of 
negotiation cost include frequency of sale and risk about the product.  
 
Monitoring and enforcement costs are incurred by a buyer/seller in order to monitor the 
performance of the counter party and to execute contracts. Transaction cost related to 
monitoring and enforcement costs varies depending on the type of contract between buyer and 
seller, payment type, and enforcement of contract. Transactions that require repeated 
performance of the parties involved, i.e., performance related to a transaction that does not 
end at a single point in time but extends over more than one period, usually requires 
monitoring of one party by the other. Such type of transactions usually involves higher 
uncertainty and costs. Depending on the legal system, the potential cost to a producer for 
enforcing a contract can be substantial enough to reduce the incentive of long-term contract.  
 
We now formalize the problem by assuming that under a given institutional and technological 
framework a seller’s decision between middlemen versus direct buyer depends on transaction 
costs minimization. If  p  is the market price, 
m tc and 
d tc are the transaction costs associated 
with selling to middlemen and to direct buyers, and 
m p and 
d p are the price that a seller gets 
                                                 
12 See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988)   6 
when he sells to middlemen and direct buyer respectively, then the marketing choice,  y , of a 
seller for a particular product depends on: 
 
 ) ; , (
y d m Z p p y y =      (1) 
 
Here 
y Z  is the institutional environment. Assuming that each producer is a cost minimizer (or 
equivalently profit maximizer), under a given institutional environment, a producer will opt 
for direct selling when 
d m p p p p − > − . Alternatively s/he will choose middlemen when 
d m p p p p − < −  and s/he will be indifferent between middlemen and direct selling when 
d m p p p p − = − . However, as both 
m p and 
d p depend on transaction costs that the producer 
face and 
m m tc p p − =  and 
d d tc p p − = , the seller’s decision rule depends on p , 
m tc  and 
d tc :  
 
 ) ; , , (
y m d Z tc tc p y y =      (2) 
 
Assuming that the market price  p  is exogenous to the model, we find that the seller’s supply 
decision, that means the choice between middlemen and direct selling, given by (2) can be 
rewritten as:  
 
 ) ; , (
y m d Z tc tc y y =      (3) 
 
3. Rural Producers, Marketing Options and Prices 
The rural economy in Bangladesh is dominated by crop production. As a result, the majority 
of households living in rural areas are involved in crop production either as landlords, farmers 
and sharecroppers or as agricultural workers. In contrast to crop production, households that 
produce eggs, chicken and milk for the market are usually both land and labour poor and have 
limited access to crop production. Table-3 presents some basic characteristics of producers of 
these three products and compares them with the full sample that does not include these 
producers (labelled as partial sample) and the full sample that includes them (labelled as full 
sample).  
 
Table-3: Small Producers vis-à-vis Full Sample (mean & standard deviation) 
Characteristics  Egg, Chicken and Milk 
Producers 
Partial Sample  Full Sample 
Land ownership (in decimal)  93.64 (68.17)  180.17 (286.41)  154.58 (246.19) 
Household size  5.17 (1.41)  5.47 (1.86)  5.38 (1.75) 
Income, yearly total (in Taka)  47782.50 (32288.15)  86033.08 (124036.53)  74719.53 (106911.4) 
Expenditure, yearly total (in Taka)  54634.11 (45198.67)  92778.40 (111474.22)  81496.29 (98190.44) 
   7 
As can be seen from the table, the mean amount of land that producers of eggs, chicken and 
milk own is less than that both of the two other samples. Taking household size as a proxy for 
family labour supply, these households are relatively labour poor compared to the other two 
samples’ households. The claim of their resource poorness is also reflected in their income 
and expenditures, which are lower than of their counterparts. In addition, assuming that NGO 
membership is a source of micro credit for such products promoted by NGOs in Bangladesh, 
one can see that 38.1% of the producers are NGO members compared to 26.5% in partial 
sample and 29.9% in full sample.  
 
The different channels that rural producers in Bangladesh utilize in marketing their products 
are brokers, whole-sellers, direct buyers, and bringing to the nearest market. Assuming that 
there is no difference between selling to the direct buyer and bringing to the nearest market 
place and selling, i.e., considering both methods as selling to direct consumers, all these 
different channels can be arranged under two categories: mediated selling and direct selling. 
Table-4 reports the choice of marketing channels of rural producers.  
 
Table-4: Market Participation Behaviour of Rural Producers and Marketing Channels 
Product Name  Percentage of Households that Sales: 
  Only to middlemen  Only to direct buyers  Both to middlemen and direct buyers 
Egg 32.81  34.38  32.81 
Poultry 17.54  49.00  33.46 
Milk 21.15  36.53  42.32 
 
As seen in table-4, the marketing behaviour of agricultural households is essentially censored 
in nature. Among the 64 households that produce eggs, 32.81% of them sell 100% of their 
sales to middlemen, 34.38% of them sell 100% of their sales to direct consumers, and the rest 
32.81% sell both to middlemen and direct consumers. Among the 57 households that produce 
chicken, 17.54% of them sell 100% of their sales to middlemen, 49% of them sales 100% of 
their sales to direct consumers, and the rest 33.46% sell both to middlemen and direct 
consumers. Among the 52 households that produce milk, 21.15% of them sell 100% to 
middlemen, 36.53% sell 100% of their sales to direct consumers, and the rest 42.32% sell 
both to middlemen and direct consumers.  
 
To explore the impact of information in the form of access to telephone on the choice of 
marketing channels between mediated and direct selling, we have rearranged the table-4 into 
table-5. Table-5 reports the selling intensity to direct buyers and compares the producers 
under two categories: producers from villages with telephone and producers from villages 
without telephone. It appears that for all three products, the former group of producers choose 
direct buyers over middlemen more than the later group and the differences between the 
producers of each of the product are significant.    8 
 
Table-5: Production Sold to the Direct Buyers (Mean): Village with and without Telephone 
Products  Village without telephone  Village with telephone  Mean difference 
Egg 42.20  (42.69)  80.43  (33.37)  38.24** 
Poultry 56.06  (41.75)  96.88  (9.07) 40.81** 
Milk 34.10  (43.75)  90.91  (30.15)  56.81** 
Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviation; **Significant at 1% level. 
 
To explore the role of price in selecting marketing channels, we compare the average selling 
prices that the two groups of producers received when they have utilized only one of the two 
channels, i.e., we include two polar choices only. Table-6 reports the average (mean) selling 
price along with the difference in means. With the exception of egg, there is no significant 
difference between the prices received from two channels; it is only the egg producers that 
sell their products to direct buyers receive a higher price than those who sell to middlemen.  
 
Table-6: Average Selling Price: Mediated vis-à-vis Direct Selling 
Price of:  Only to Direct Consumers  Only to Middlemen  Difference in Means 
Egg 11.45  (1.10)  9.40  (1.19)  2.05** 
Chicken 68.04  (10.30)  62.00  (12.29)  6.04 
Milk 17.05  (4.18)  17.18  (3.16)  -0.13 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
In addition, we have calculated the difference between the price in the nearest local market 
and the actual price that the producers received when they sold to middlemen or to direct 
consumers. Here the nearest Thana town has been taken as the nearest local market. Thana in 
Bangladesh is the lowest administrative unit and characterized by the presence of direct 
buyers and intermediaries for agricultural products. Table-7 reports the difference in average 
selling prices: the first column is the local market price minus direct selling price and the 
second column is the local market price minus the mediated selling price. As can be seen, 
none of the differences are statistically significant. It implies that the price that the rural 
producers receive either from selling to direct consumers or from selling to middlemen is not 
significantly different from the nearest local market prices. The third column reports the 
difference of the differences – the difference between column first and second columns; as 
can be seen, with the exception of chicken, other two price differences are not statistically 
significant. 
 
Table-7: Difference in Average Selling Price: Local Market vis-à-vis Direct Selling and Local Market vis-à-vis 
Mediated Selling (Mean and Standard Deviation) 
Price of:  Local Market vis-à-vis 
Direct Consumers 




Egg 2.14  (2.37)  2.25  (2.12)  -0.107 
Chicken 3.57  (4.05)  10.0  (9.72)  -6.4286* 
Milk 2.16  (2.81)  2.27  (2.05)  -0.1148 
~ Calculated as in table-3; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
   9 
To relate the difference in price with access to information, we look at the prices of the 
products received by the producers of the two categories of villages. Table-8 reports the mean 
price of three different products received by surveyed households and difference in mean 
prices. As can be seen from the table, though the mean price of milk and chicken producers of 
villages with telephone is higher than their counterparts, none of the price difference is 
statistically significant. Prices that the middlemen offer do not seem to be statistically 
different from the prices that the producers receive otherwise from the direct buyers.  
 
Table-8: Mean Price Received by Producers and Difference in Prices: Village with and without Telephone 
Products  Village without telephone  Village with telephone  Mean difference 
Egg 10.32  (1.46)  10.75  (2.54)  -0.433 
Poultry 70.88  (14.80)  68.13  (10.30)  2.757 
Milk 16.54  (2.98)  18.09  (3.11)  -1.554 
Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviation. 
 
To explore the issue further, we have assumed a positive relationship between distance to the 
nearest telephone and cost of information and we have taken the distance to the nearest 
telephone as a proxy for the access to the information. To see the impact of access to 
information on price differences, we have divided all the producers in two usual categories: 
producers from villages with telephone and producers from villages without telephone. The 
bivariate correlation shows that the distance to the nearest telephone and the difference in 
price are positively correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.232), and the correlation is 
significant (the level of significance is 0.014). However, in case of the producers from the 
villages with telephone, the correlation coefficient between price difference and distance to 
the nearest telephone is not significant.  
 
The explorative type of analysis of this section suggests that the availability of telephone 
might have some relationship with the rural producers choice of marketing channels between 
mediated vis-à-vis direct selling. In addition, the distance to telephone might also have some 
relationship with the observed price differences between the local market and the price that 
the producers receive. However, the analysis cannot provide any direction of the relationship. 
In addition, the observed relationship might be a mere correlation and not causation. We 
explore these issues further in the next section.  
 
4. Empirical Estimation 
 
4.1 Empirical Specification 
We specify the two observed characteristics of the rural producers: discrete choice between 
mediated selling vis-à-vis direct selling, and the selling intensity separately. 
 
Discrete Choice: In terms of selecting marketing channels, there are three groups of producers 
that can be seen from table-1; sell only to middlemen, sell only to direct consumers, and sell   10 
to both middlemen and direct consumers. To see the discrete choice between mediated vis-à-
vis direct selling, we consider the last two groups together and form two groups. More 
specifically, we form these two groups based on whether a producer sales to direct buyer or 
not.  
 
Econometrically, the specification problem follows a latent regression model:  
 
  ε β + ′ = tc y*         ( 4 )  
 
Where * y  the latent variable is unobserved. What we observe is a dummy variable  y defined 
by  
 1 = y  if  0 *> y  
  0 = y   otherwise       (5) 
 
Here  tcis the vector of transaction costs variables. We use probit method to estimate this 
equation. The likelihood function of this model can be written as: 
 
  () () [] ∏ ∏
= =
′ − Φ − ′ − Φ =
1 0




i i i tc tc tc y L β β σ β    (6) 
 
The marginal effects of this model can be written as:
13  
 
  k i i
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c t c t
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∂
∂
   (7) 
 
Selling Intensity: To account for the intensity, we use a two limits tobit model to specify the 
behaviour of rural producers. The model choice is motivated by the fact that the observations 
on dependent variable are censored both at the upper and lower ends. Though there are other 
alternatives, it was Tobin who first discussed this problem of censored data in the regression 
context (Tobin, 1958). Later, economists have applied tobit models in different context, e.g., 
household expenditure, labour force participation, to mention a few.
14 
 
The use of a particular marketing channel by a producer has a maximum limit, 
u
i L , a 
minimum limit, 
l
i L , and values in between. Now if 
*
i q  is the latent variable and  i q is the 
observed counterpart, the model can be defined as follows: 
 
i i i tc q ε β + ′ =
*         ( 8 )  
                                                 
13 See Maddala (1983), page 22-23. 
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Here,  i tc  is the vector of transaction cost related variables, β′ is the vector of estimated 
parameters, and  i ε  is the vector of error terms. Following Maddala (1983), the likelihood 
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Denoting  [ ] σ β / ) ( i
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Assuming that  i ε  is a continuous random variable with mean 0 and variance 
2 σ , and 
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4.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
We use data from a household survey conducted in six different regions in Bangladesh during 
January and February of 2001. The survey consisted of three villages from each region with a 
total sample size of 284 households. It followed a two stage stratified random sampling 
process; at the first stage selecting the strata, and at the second stage selecting the households 
from each strata. The survey assumed each administrative district as a region, considered each 
region as a cluster and arranged all the clusters according to the availability of access to 
                                                 
15 See Maddala (1983), page 160-161.  
16 For a formal proof, see Greene (2000), page 909-910.   12 
telecommunications. At this stage, the survey selected six clusters randomly. Once the 
clusters were decided, the next step was to select households from each cluster. In order to 
improve the efficiency of statistical inference, a stratified random sample design was chosen: 
the households were stratified on the basis of ease of access to telecommunications 
infrastructure. Access was defined in terms of distance that needs to be travelled to access 
telecom services. Thus, three strata were created where villages represent strata, and from 
each village an equal number of households was sampled.  Households were selected using 
systematic random sampling procedure. 
 
The survey contained questions on the households’ production and marketing behaviour, the 
choice of marketing channels, and the variables related to transactions costs. In addition, the 
survey also collected respondents’ personal and family characteristics. Table-9 provides 
summary statistics of dependent and transaction costs variables. Before proceeding further, 
we discuss the dependent and TC variables in brief. 
 
Table-9: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Variable Name  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables:      
Discrete choice between middle and direct buyer  MKT_1 0.757  0.430 
Sales to direct consumer as a % of total sales  MKT_2 58.688  44.080 
      
Independent Variables:      
Price difference  P_DIF  2.9118  4.3770 
Search and Information      
Price discovery cost  INF_DIS  4.249 4.982 
Information availability  INF_SPILL  28.884 21.130 
Negotiation      
Dependency on product  PRO_DEP  7.686 9.972 
Dependency on buyer
+ BUY_DEP  2.572 1.483 
Sales frequency
+ SAL_FRE  4.488 0.813 
Market structure  MKT_STR  19.659 12.822 
Knowledge about product quality
+ KN_QLTY  4.607 0.980 
Risk about the product
+ PRO_RSK  3.272 1.585 
Monitoring and enforcement      
Type of contract with the buyer
+ CON_TYPE  2.376 1.556 
Payment type
+ PAY_TYPE  1.821 1.010 
Enforcement of contract
+ CON_ENF  2.867 0.988 
 
The first dependent variable, MKT_1, is the bivariate state between selling to direct buyers 
vis-à-vis selling to middlemen. Here selling to direct buyers assumes the value one and selling 
to middlemen assumes zero. The second dependent variable, MKT_2, is the sales to direct 
consumer as a percentage of total sales.  
 
The first independent variable, the difference between the local market price and the actual 
price received by the producers denoted by P_DIF has already been discussed in section 3. 
Two variables related to search and information costs are price discovery cost (INF_DIS) and   13 
information availability (INF_SPILL). For price discovery cost, the distance of nearest 
publicly accessible telephone in kilometers has been taken as a proxy assuming a positive 
correlation between distance and cost of information. To capture the information spill over 
within a village that may reduce search and information cost, the users of a particular village 
as a percentage of sample size of that village has been taken as a proxy. For this, we have 
assumed that while there is a positive intra-village information spill over, there exists no such 
inter-village information spill over. That information flow within a village is higher than 
between villages is based on the assumption that due to social ties and traditions villagers 
share information among them through different economic and social interactions.
17 As 
expected, both information and search costs variables, INF_DIS and INF_SPILL, are highly 
correlated and the correlation coefficient is significant at 1% level. To avoid this collinearty, 
we include only the INF_DIS in our estimation.   
 
In case of negotiation costs, all the variables, except dependency on product and market 
structure have been measured in intervals, 1 to 5 scales.  The dependency on the product 
(PRO_DEP) measures income from the sale as a percentage of total household income. The 
dependency on buyer (BUY_DEP) measures the dependency on a single buyer where 
dependency is measured from no dependency to high dependency at a scale of 1 to 5, 
respectively. The sales frequency (SAL_FRE) is defined as how frequent a producer sells the 
product and measured from less frequent 1 to high frequent 5. The market structure 
(MKT_STR) is the number of available buyers for one of the particular products. The 
knowledge about product quality (KN_QLTY) is defined as whether a producer is aware 
about the quality of the product and is measured from no to yes at a scale of 1 to 5, 
respectively. The risk about the product (PRO_RSK) is the risk of damage or spoilage due to 
non-selling and is measured from no risk 1 to high risk 5. 
 
In case of monitoring and enforcement costs, all the variables have been measured in 
intervals. The type of contract with the buyer (CON_TYPE) is defined as whether there is any 
contract between buyer and seller and is measured from no contract to clearly specified 
written contract at a scale of 1 to 5, respectively. The payment type (PAY_TYPE) is the type 
of payment and is measured from immediate cash payment to uncertain payment at a scale of 
1 to 5 respectively. The enforcement of contract (CON_ENF) is the cost required to enforcing 
contract and is measured as no cost to high cost at a scale of 1 to 5, respectively.  
 
Before proceeding further it should be noted that some of the variables as mentioned above 
are measured in 1 to 5 scales. However, for the present estimation purpose, we treat them here 
                                                 
17 Among the surveyed households, about 19 percent of them reported their neighbour from the same village as a 
source of information about prices of all the products on an average, which shows the presence of a strong intra-
village information spill over.   14 
as continuous variables. In fact one of the reasons for not considering them as dummy 
variables is the small size of the present sample.
18  
 
4.3 Estimation Results 
Table-10 and table-11 report the value of the estimated coefficients along with their respective 
standard errors and marginal effects. Both tables contain the same set of explanatory variables 
described in summary statistics. Variables that have been dropped for high correlation with 
other regressors are INF_SPILL, BUY_DEP, MKT_STR, CON_TYPE, and PAY_TYPE. In 
order to be more tractable, we discuss the findings under three different types of transactions 
costs.  
 
Table-10: Estimation Results: The Discrete Choice between Middlemen vis-à-vis Direct 
Selling. Dependent Variable: Middlemen=0, Direct Selling=1. Method: Probit 
Regressors Coefficients  Marginal  Effects 
P_DIF -0.0431  -0.0098 
 (0.0387)  (0.0088) 
INF_DIS -0.1412  -0.0323 
 (0.0272)**  (0.0073)** 
PRO_DEP -0.0372  -0.0085 
 (0.0146)*  (0.0034)* 
SAL_FRE 0.3591  0.082 
 (0.2444)  (0.0534) 
KN_QLTY -0.3756  -0.0858 
 (0.1913)*  (0.0429)* 
PRO_RSK 0.1656  0.0378 
 (0.0891)  (0.0201) 
CON_ENF -0.5893  -0.1346 
 (0.1891)**  (0.0444)** 
Egg dummy  -0.4461  -0.1086 
 (0.3384)  (0.0889) 
Chicken dummy  1.1255  0.2121 
 (0.5710)*  (0.0803) 
Constant 3.1088   
 (1.7016)   
Observations 169  169 
Log likelihood  -53.392  -53.392 
Probability > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.4298  0.4298 
Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
                                                 
18 For a full treatment of this issue, see Robinson (1988) that describes the method of consistent semiparametric 
regression.   15 
Table-11. Estimation Results: Selling Intensity  
Dependent variable: Percentage of production sold to direct consumers, Method: Tobit 
Regressors Coefficients  Marginal  Effects
1 
P_DIF -2.065  -0.4347 
 (1.5844)  (0.3335) 
INF_DIS -8.7053  -1.8323 
 (1.3999)**  (0.2947)** 
PRO_DEP -5.4253  -1.1422 
 (0.7538)**  (0.1587)** 
SAL_FRE 17.7652  3.7400 
 (9.484)~  (1.9966)~ 
KN_QLTY -6.3908  -1.3455 
 (5.9991)  (1.26297) 
PRO_RSK 11.2544  2.3694 
 (3.9133)**  (0.8238)** 
CON_ENF -18.8789  -3.9745 
 (6.7174)**  (1.4142)** 
Egg dummy  -51.9093  -10.9341 
 (16.0413)**  (3.3771)** 
Chicken dummy  22.1838  4.6395 
 (20.0578)  (4.2227) 
Constant 132.7862   
 (64.3057)*   
No of Observations
2 169  169 
Log likelihood  -392.8642  -392.8642 
Probability > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.1442  0.1442 
1 Conditional on being uncensored; 
2 41 left-censored observations, 60 uncensored observations and 
68 right-censored observations. Standard errors are in parentheses; ~significant at 10% level; * significant at 
5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
Search and Information Costs: Search and information cost has a significant impact on the 
marketing behaviour of rural producers. Access to information in the form of access to 
telephone has significant positive impact on the discrete choice of selling to direct buyers and 
on selling intensity. There exists a negative relation between selling to direct consumers and 
information costs, and as the search and information costs increase, rural households sell more 
of their products to middlemen instead of selling to direct buyers. 
 
Negotiation Costs: In case of negotiation costs, the product dependency has a significant 
impact both on the discrete choice and on the selling intensity to direct buyers; the more 
dependent a producer on a single product is, the less the probability of selling to direct buyers. 
As expected high sales frequency has positive effect on the amount of selling to direct buyers. 
However, it does not have any impact on the discrete choice of marketing channels. The 
knowledge of producers about product quality affects the amount of direct selling negatively. 
It implies that as producers become aware of the quality of their products, their bargaining 
power relative to middlemen and intermediaries increases and reduces the transaction costs   16 
related to negotiation. The other source of bargaining power that has a significant positive 
impact on the selling intensity is product risk; as risk increases, producers tend to choose 
direct selling over mediated selling. 
 
Two variables that we could not include here due to high collinearity are market structure and 
dependency on buyers. As market structure is highly negatively correlated with product 
dependency and buyer dependency is highly positively correlated with product dependency 
(the correlation coefficients are -0.509 and 0.564 respectively and both are significant at 1% 
level), it can be expected that market structure has a positive impact and product dependency 
has a negative impact on selling to direct buyers.  
 
Monitoring and Enforcement Costs: Transaction costs related to monitoring and enforcement 
costs have a significant impact on the choice of marketing channels and on selling intensity. 
Contract enforcement is negatively related with selling to direct buyers and as the cost of 
contract enforcement increases, producers chose to sell their products to middlemen over 
direct buyers. Two other variables related to monitoring and enforcement costs that we could 
not include due to collinerity, contract type and pay type are highly correlated with contract 
enforcement and product dependency respectively (correlation coefficients are 0.727 and 
0.448 respectively and they are significant at 1%). Due to this high correlation, one can 
predict that formal contracts of households with middlemen reduce selling to direct buyers, 
and payment uncertainty also reduces selling to direct buyers. 
 
4.4 Causation or mere Correlation?  
The empirical findings described above suggest that access to information in the form of 
access to telephone has significant impact on the rural households’ discrete choice of 
marketing channels and it also has significant impact on selling intensity as well. Although 
both estimates imply that access to telephone significantly reduces transaction costs and 
increases selling to direct buyers, both estimates assume that the match of a household to the 
distance of telephone is exogenous. However, if a household’s unobserved propensity to sell 
to a direct buyer is correlated with the distance to telephone, then our estimates will be subject 
to an omitted variable bias. To address the issue of omitted variable bias, we control for more 
observed characteristics. In particular, we control for local market and market-leading 
physical infrastructure that can influence direct selling.
19  
 
To control for other form of marketing infrastructure other than access to telecommunications, 
we have added access to the nearest market. For physical infrastructure, the distance of the 
village from the nearest paved road has been chosen as a proxy. As we are primarily 
concerned with market reaching physical infrastructure, due to the dominance of road in 
                                                 
19 Controlling for more observed characteristics as a remedy of omitted variables has been discussed in Evans et 
al. (1999).   17 
transportation services in Bangladesh, this is a reasonable choice. For proximity to the 
physical market place, the distance of the village from the nearest Thana head quarter has 
been chosen as a proxy. The rationale behind choosing Thana as a proxy for the local market 
has been described in section-3. However, distance to the local market is significantly 
correlated with the distance to the paved road (the correlation coefficient is 0.151 and 
significant at 5% level). To avoid possible collinearity, we drop the distance to the nearest 
local market (Thana), and include only the distance of the village to the nearest paved road.  
 
Table-12: Effects on Marketing Infrastructure on Households’ Marketing Behaviour 
Dependent variable:  Discrete Choice (Direct buyer=1, 
Middlemen=0) 
  Selling Intensity to direct buyers as a % 
of total production 
Regressors  Probit Coefficients  Marginal Effects    Tobit Coefficients  Marginal Effects 
Road  -0.2365 (0.0989)*  -0.0511 (0.0206)*    -16.288 (4.0220)**  -3.6902 (0.9112)** 
Information  -0.1456 (0.0285)**  -0.0315 (0.0075)**    -8.6343 (1.3866)**  -1.9562 (0.3141)** 
Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  
 
Table-12 reports the coefficients and marginal effects of road and information on households’ 
marketing choice. Table-13 and table-14 provide the coefficients and related statistics of other 
regressors. The estimation results show that physical infrastructure has significant impact on 
rural producers’ choice of marketing channels. In addition, as this variable is significantly 
correlated with the proximity to the nearest market, the local market may also play a 
significant role. However, though access to road has a significant impact on households 
marketing behaviour, inclusion of this additional variable does not change the significance of 
the effects of access to information on households marketing behaviour. The results imply 
that access to information in the form of access to telephone has significant impact on 
household’s choice of marketing channels between middlemen and direct buyers.  
   18 
Table-13: Estimation Results: The Discrete Choice between Middlemen vis-à-vis Direct 
Selling. Dependent Variable: Middlemen=0, Direct Selling=1. Method: Probit 
Regressors Coefficients  Marginal  Effects 
P_DIF -0.0575  -0.0124 
 (0.0411)  (0.0088) 
INF_DIS -0.1456  -0.0315 
 (0.0285)**  (0.0075)** 
ROAD -0.2365  -0.0511 
 (0.0989)*  (0.0206)* 
PRO_DEP -0.0409  -0.0088 
 (0.0152)**  (0.0033)** 
SAL_FRE 0.4007  0.0866 
 (0.2629)  (0.0534) 
KN_QLTY -0.3249  -0.0702 
 (0.1933)~  (0.0417)~ 
CON_ENF -0.6162  -0.1332 
 (0.1927)**  (0.0431)** 
Egg dummy  -0.3996  -0.0918 
 (0.3413)  (0.0847) 
Chicken dummy  1.1737  0.207 
 (0.5991)*  (0.0777)* 
Constant 3.8236   
 (1.6828)*   
Observations 169  169 
Log likelihood  -52.1182  -52.1182 
Probability > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.4434  0.4434 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ~significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant 
at 1% level 
 
Table-14. Estimation Results: Selling Intensity  
Dependent variable: Percentage of production sold to direct consumers, Method: Tobit 
Regressors Coefficients  Marginal  Effects
1 
P_DIF -2.8975  -0.6564487 
 (1.5684)~  (0.3553357)~ 
INF_DIS -8.6343  -1.956163 
 (1.3866)**  (0.3141422)** 
ROAD -16.288  -3.69018 
 (4.0220)**  (0.911224)** 
PRO_DEP -5.3794  -1.218746 
 (0.7280)**  (0.1649255)** 
SAL_FRE 15.8861  3.599133 
 (9.4524)~  (2.141521)~ 
KN_QLTY -3.3305  -.7545441 
 (5.8804)  (1.332245) 
CON_ENF -18.1304  -4.107602 
 (6.4646)**  (1.464619)** 
Egg dummy  -47.4054  -10.7601 
 (15.4106)**  (3.49140)** 
Chicken dummy  16.9887  3.827046 
 (19.6164)  (4.444257) 
Constant 192.6541   
 (61.3582)**   
No of Observations
2 169  169 
Log likelihood  -388.249  -388.249 
Probability > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.1542  0.1542 
1 Conditional on being uncensored; 
2 41 left-censored observations, 60 uncensored observations and 
68 right-censored observations. Standard errors are in parentheses; ~significant at 10% level;  * significant at 
5% level; ** significant at 1% level   19 
 
5. Conclusion 
Accesses to information and transaction costs have important impact on rural producers’ 
choice of marketing channels between middlemen and direct buyers of agricultural products 
in Bangladesh. The empirical findings of this paper suggest that transaction costs, particularly 
information cost has significant influence on the farm households’ discrete choice of 
marketing channels and continuous choice of selling intensity to direct buyers over 
middlemen. Apart from information costs, transaction costs related to negotiation, and 
monitoring and enforcement are also important.  
 
For the small producers of rural regions, access to information appears to be important to link 
them with direct buyers. Under the given circumstances in Bangladesh, access to information 
in the form of access to telecommunications can reduce the transaction cost related to search 
and information costs of small producers significantly, and induce direct selling over 
mediated selling. However, other market reaching physical infrastructures, for instance paved 
road, and proximity to physical market are also important to link the rural producers with the 
direct buyers.  
 
Aspects of transaction costs related to negotiation costs and hence bargaining power are either 
intrinsic with the products or broad and difficult to capture. For example, with the absence of 
any storage and processing facility, high sales frequency of eggs and milk is a necessary 
precondition due to the intrinsic nature of those products. As a result, producers of such 
products would like to sell to a regular buyer. As can be predicted a priori, a higher number of 
buyers are associated with a higher amount of direct selling, which support the lower 
transaction costs linked to a competitive market structure.  
 
The monitoring and enforcements costs are primarily to do with the contractual arrangements 
and legal framework. Producers seem to link with middlemen with formal contractual 
arrangements that reduce the likelihood of selling to direct buyers. As it is expected, formal 
contracts with middlemen and intermediaries reduce selling to direct buyers.  
 
Findings of the paper also suggest that the existence of middlemen in rural areas ensures price 
equality. As the empirical findings suggest, price does not work as a significant incentive to 
show any discrete shift in producers’ choice between mediated vis-à-vis direct selling or in 
selling intensity. That means, once we control for possible sources of transaction costs, the 
different channels that the rural producers use in Bangladesh do not result in significant price 
differences, neither between different channels nor between the local market and channels.   
   20 
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